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Abstract. The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) works by frequently
exchanging updates that disseminate reachability information about IP
prefixes (i.e., IP address blocks) between Autonomous Systems (ASes) on
the Internet. The ideal operation of BGP relies on three major behavioral
assumptions (BAs): (1) information contained in the update is legal and
correct, (2) a route to a prefix is stable, and (3) the route adheres to the
valley free routing policy. The current operation of BGP implicitly trusts
all ASes to adhere to these assumptions. However, several documented
violation of these assumptions attest to the fact that such an assump-
tion of trust is perilous. This paper presents AS-TRUST, a scheme that
comprehensively characterizes the trustworthiness of ASes with respect
to their adherence of the behavioral assumptions. AS-TRUST quanti-
fies trust using the notion of AS reputation. To compute reputation,
AS-TRUST analyzes updates received in the past. It then classifies the
resulting observations into multiple types of feedback. The feedback is
used by a reputation function that uses Bayesian statistics to compute
a probabilistic view of AS trustworthiness. This information can then
be used for improving quotidian BGP operation by enabling improved
route preference and dampening decision making at the ASes. Our im-
plementation of AS-TRUST scheme using publicly available BGP traces
demonstrates: (1) the number of ASes involved in violating the BGP
behavioral assumptions is significant, and (2) the proposed reputation
mechanism provides multi-fold improvement in the ability of ASes to
operate in the presence of BA violations.
1 Introduction
Large IP domains, called Autonomous Systems (ASes) use the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) as the standard communication protocol. BGP enables ASes to
exchange IP prefix (i.e., IP address blocks) reachability information with each
other through periodic propagation of BGP update messages. The reachability
information within a BGP update consists of IP prefixes, and an ordered list of
? This research was supported in part by ONR MURI N00014-07-1-0907. POC: Insup
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ASes, called AS PATH, through which the prefix is reachable. Additionally, BGP
relies on three major behavioral assumptions (BAs) to operate: (1) information
contained in the update is legal and correct, (2) a route to a prefix is stable,
and (3) the route adheres to the valley free routing policy. Violation to any of
these behavioral assumptions can have severe consequences for the inter-domain
routing. The past decade has seen numerous incidences of BA violations. For
instance prefix hijacking, when an AS claims to directly reach (i.e., own) a prefix
contrary to its actual capability [5] and [10]; valley route, which might prevent
BGP convergence [2]; and unstable or potentially spoofed link insertion in the
AS PATH to make the route more attractive [25].
In this paper, we present AS-TRUST, a novel scheme for quantifying the
level of trust1 one can have on the ASes based on their adherence to the BAs.
This trust quantification has many benefits: (1) obtain a succinct but global
view of the current state of inter-domain routing and the extent to which it is
plagued by the aforementioned hijacking, stability and policy violation issues,
(2) potentially minimize the ASes that violate BAs by making the AS trust-
worthiness information available to the entire BGP community, and (3) use the
information to make informed policy decisions about any new updates received
from the ASes.
In AS-TRUST, trust is quantified using the notion of AS reputation. This is
based on the observation that AS behavior is repetitive. To compute the reputa-
tion of an AS, AS-TRUST evaluates past BGP updates received for exhibition
of specific behaviors, based on well-defined properties. The behavior evaluation
provides feedback to a Bayesian reputation function to generate a probabilistic
view of the trustworthiness of all the observable ASes in the Internet. Note that,
a low reputation for an AS does not mean it is necessarily malicious. It simply
means it has violated one or more of the behavioral assumptions. It could have
done it for a variety of reasons including misconfiguration, traffic engineering
purposes, as well as malice. We argue that, as it has been shown that violating
these individual assumption has consequences for the inter-domain routing space
[2] [5] and [25], one needs to be aware of their occurrence. The AS-TRUST rep-
utation values allow us to achieve this sense of awareness. Our implementation
of AS-TRUST demonstrates the following: (1) incidents of BA violation are con-
sistently present, (2) a considerable percentage of ASes (5-6%) are involved in
some form of BA violation with a handful exhibiting poor behavior exclusively,
and (3) the proposed reputation mechanism significantly improves the ability of
ASes to operate in the presence of BA violations. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first attempt to quantify the behavioral assumptions of BGP in a
systematic manner.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background on BGP
and the problem statement. Section 3 presents details of AS-TRUST including
the notion of BGP service, feedback mechanism, and the reputation function em-
ployed. Section 4 presents the properties for evaluating the BGP services. Section
1 Trust is defined as the competence of an entity to exhibit a specific behavior(s) [16].
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5 presents the AS reputation computation and analysis. Section 6 presents the
related work, followed by Section 7, which concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Border Gateway Protocol
The Border Gateway Protocol is a path-vector routing protocol for exchanging
information about reaching IP prefixes. Using BGP, each AS informs its neigh-
bors about the best available route to prefixes it can reach. In this regard, AS
sends out a BGP update message announcing the prefix. Similarly, an AS can
withdraw a prefix that it has previously announced. Each AS through which the
update passes adds its AS number to the message. This ordered list of ASes
called the AS PATH informs an AS receiving the update, the path through
which the prefix can be reached. When an update is received by an AS contain-
ing a prefix announcement, it has to determine whether it should be accepted
or not. Acceptance means that the AS is willing to add the route to its routing
information base. Each AS has its own policies that determine whether it accepts
a BGP update and whether it forwards it (the update) to its neighbors. Routing
policies serve an important purpose in BGP and provide an AS with not only
the capability to prefer routes over others to reach a prefix, but also to filter
and/or tag an update to change the route’s relative preference downstream.
2.2 Problem Statement and Approach
The current version of BGP [1] was designed with only effectiveness in mind. It
implicitly assumes ASes can be trusted to adhere to certain behavioral assump-
tions (BAs). We say that an AS is violating (i.e., not adhering to) the BAs, if it
displays any of the following five behaviors:
– Illegality: The values of the AS number and the prefixes in the update are
from a restricted range, that is the AS numbers are private or the prefixes
are bogons.
– Hijack: An AS falsely claims to own a prefix in the update. Such false claims
on someone else’s prefixes can have adverse consequences including loss of
service [10], or can be used for spamming purposes [28].
– Vacillation: An update is deemed vacillating if it is part of a quick succession
of announcements and withdrawals involving a specific prefix perpetuated by
an AS that owns it. Vacillation can cause frequent route-flapping at the up-
stream ASes, which is detrimental to BGP stability and router performance
[?].
– Valley Route: The AS PATH of an update has one or more ASes that form
a valley. An AS in the AS PATH is said to form a valley if: (1) it forwards
a route received from its provider2 to another provider, or (2) it forwards a
2 ASes and their neighbors usually have one of the four relationships: provider-to-
customer (Pv2C), customer-to-provider (C2Pv), sibling-to-sibling (S2S), and (P2P)
peer-to-peer[15].
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route with an existing peer-to-peer link to one of its own peers. Most ASes
try to follow a valley-free routing (VFR) guideline in their export policy
settings [26] as VFR have been shown to be a sufficient condition to ensure
that convergence of BGP [15].
– Unstable AS-Links: An AS propagates updates through a short-lived AS-
link (i.e., a hop between individual ASes in the AS PATH ). Detecting such
unstable AS-link bindings is important, since ASes which chose a path with
one or more unstable AS-links may increase the latency of data delivery,
increase the number of BGP updates exchanged within the inter-domain
routing space, and may be indicative of link spoofing [23]
The principal question this paper tries to address is “what is the probability
with which an AS adheres and violates the behavioral assumptions of BGP?” In
this regard, we use the notion of reputation. Reputation is a quantitative measure
of an entity’s likelihood to perform a specific task based on its past behavior [20].
The idea is to compute the reputation for all the ASes in the Internet based on
the updates received in the past and analyze them for adherence to the BAs. This
is done in four steps: (1) collecting BGP updates in a database; (2) evaluating the
data in the database, over a well-defined duration called the observation window,
for the exhibition of the aforementioned five behaviors; (3) recording the results
of the analysis as feedback; and (4) using feedback to compute reputation for the
ASes. Reputation is a dynamic value which changes as the AS behavior changes,
over time. This is accomplished by repeating the evaluation process over a sliding
observation window and generating updated feedback.
2.3 Experiment Setup
We implemented the proposed scheme and conducted a six month long experi-
ment measuring the evolving trustworthiness of ASes, on an Internet-scale. To
receive the latest BGP updates, we use the RouteViews BGP trace collector,
maintained by University of Oregon [11]. The RouteViews trace collector is a
group of BGP routers which peer with a large number of ISPs via BGP sessions.
At the time of writing, the RouteViews received BGP updates from 46 ASes.
It has been shown in [30] that RouteViews receives updates from almost all the
ASes currently active within the Internet and is therefore a good source for com-
puting reputation of ASes. Just as many of the past works in BGP security [27],
we assume the RouteViews repository to be trustworthy and provides us with
accurate information.
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In this work, we use BGP update data from Nov. 1, 2009 - Jun. 28, 2010
(see Figure 1). We take BGP updates received over a 60 day period called the
observation window, evaluate the AS behavior, and compute reputation for the
ASes on the 61st day. For example, data from Nov. 1, 2009 to Dec. 30, 2009 is
analyzed to compute AS reputation on Jan. 1, 2010. The observation window
is then slid forward by one day and the process is repeated. In order to be fair
to the ASes, we did not consider updates announced within 24 hours of the
end of the observation window in computing the reputation of the ASes as they
have not had enough time to prove themselves. There are over 180 observation
windows between Nov 1, 2009 and Jun. 28, 2010. The 60 day observation window
was chosen as it was long enough to prevent the behavior evaluation from being
biased by transient AS behavior.
3 AS-TRUST Reputation Computation
This section provides an overview of the principal aspects of computing trustwor-
thiness of ASes by AS-TRUST. We begin by formalizing the notion of BGP ser-
vice which forms the basis of the whole process. We then present the mechanism
for obtaining feedbacks. In the subsequent sections we describe the evaluation
process and reputation computation, respectively.
3.1 BGP Service
The principal task of BGP is to facilitate the dissemination of reachability in-
formation through updates. We model this dissemination using a novel notion
of BGP service. A BGP service is a formal way of viewing reachability infor-
mation provided collectively by the ASes in the AS PATH, called providers3, to
an observer AS receiving a BGP update. It is defined as: Si = {pi,AS PATH =
[AS0, . . . , ASN ]}. Here Si is the service identifier indexed by i, pi is the prefix be-
ing announced by AS0 as a part of the service Si, and AS0, . . . , ASN ∈ AS PATH
are the provider ASes which forward the reachability information as a part of
the service Si. Figure 2 (a) illustrates the principal concepts and entities of a
BGP service. A service said to have started when a provider AS announces a
particular prefix and ended when the prefix is withdrawn. A service can there-
fore be in two modes: active and inactive. A service is said to be active if it has
started but not ended; and inactive otherwise. An inactive service has to have
been active, at least once, in the past. Each time a service is active, it is called
an instance of that service. The bottom half of the Figure 2 (a) illustrates some
of these concepts over a time-line of a service.
A BGP service can be decomposed into three orthogonal service elements,
each of which are provided by a subset of providers: (1) AS-prefix binding: a
3 These are different from notion used in the context of VFR. Here, the term provider
ASes mean the provider of a service. In the rest of the paper, unless otherwise
specified, the term provider refers to provider ASes.
5
BGP Service S1
Update used for 
advertising reachability 
service to prefix p
Forwarder
AS Y
R2R1
Address prefix p
Announcer 
AS X
Forwarder
AS Z
Observer
AS O
R3
R4
Instance
Start End
Time-line
Active InactiveActiveInactive
Service S1’s Time-line
(a)
BGP Services
Decompose
BGP Updates
Extract
Bp Evaluation
Threshold Selection
IRR Database
AS-Prefix Binding
Reputation
RG RB RU
Calculate
Feedback
FG FB FU
BGP Service
BGP Updates
Bl Evaluation
Threshold Selection
CAIDA & DIMES 
Data-plane Probing
AS-Link Binding
Reputation
R’’G R’’B R’’U
Calculate
Feedback
F’’G F’’B F’’U
Bo Evaluation
Gao’s Algorithm
UCLA Topology
Database
Tier-I AS Heuristics
AS-Path Vector
Reputation
R’G R’B R’U
Calculate
Feedback
F’G F’B F’U
Service 
Elements
(b)
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tuple of the form (AS0, p), which is established when an AS0 announces a pre-
fix p and is broken when the prefix is withdrawn. Each BGP service has one
AS-prefix binding in it. This service element is provided by AS0. (2) AS-path
vector: is synonymous with the AS PATH in the service. It is said to be pro-
vided collectively by all the providers; and (3) AS-link binding: a tuple of the
form (ASi, ASj), which is established when ASi forwards an update to ASj . The
AS-link binding is broken when no service uses it. A service has N − 1 AS-link
bindings; one between each of the N ASes in the AS PATH. This service ele-
ment is said to be provided individually by all the providers in the AS PATH
to the observer. In the rest of the paper, we use the term AS-link bindings and
AS-links, interchangeably.
Upon observing a BGP service, the observer decomposes it into its con-
stituent service elements, each of which is then evaluated on its validity. The
results of the evaluation act as a feedback on the providers of the service ele-
ment. The next sub-section details how the behaviors described in Section 2.2
can be evaluated for the service elements, followed by the feedback mechanism
used. Note that, as the feedback is generated locally, we do not have to con-
sider the case of potentially dishonest external feedback affecting our reputation
computation outcome.
3.2 Behavior Evaluation
We propose three behavior sets, one corresponding to each service element, for
behavior evaluation. The three behavior sets comprehensively cover the behav-
ioral assumptions on which BGP operates. They are: (1) Prefix Behavior Set
(Bp): Requires that AS in the AS-prefix binding service element does not ex-
hibit prefix value illegality, hijacking or vacillating behavior; (2)Path Behavior
Set (Bo): Requires that none of the ASes in the AS-path vector service element
form a valley or exhibit AS number illegality4; (3) Link Behavior Set (Bl): Re-
4 A 16-bit AS number is illegal if its value is in the range of 64496-64511, which is
reserved for use in documentation and sample code, 64512-65534, which is designated
for private use, or 65535, which is reserved [6].
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quires that none of the ASes create an AS-link binding service element that is
short-lived.
It can be seen that there is a one-to-one mapping between the service ele-
ments and the behavior sets. Therefore, evaluating a service involves evaluating
whether AS-prefix binding, AS-path vector, and AS-link binding service elements
satisfy Bp, Bo, and Bl, respectively. However, before we delve into the details
of evaluation, we provide an overview of our feedback mechanism, which is es-
sential for reputation computation, and forms an integral part of the evaluation
process.
3.3 Feedback Mechanism
Evaluation of a BGP service element provides one of three mutually exclusive
feedbacks. The feedback can have one of three values: (1) Feedback G: this feed-
back is given on the providers that satisfies the requirements of the appropriate
behavior set; (2) Feedback B: this feedback is given on the providers that do
not satisfy the requirements of the behavior sets, however, they do not disrupt
BGP operation; and (3) Feedback U: this feedback is given on the providers that
not only violate the requirements of the behavior sets, but also disrupt BGP
operation.
In the rest of the paper, we use the term GBU feedbacks to refer to our
feedback types. When the service element implemented by the provider(s) re-
ceives Feedback G, it is referred to as good behavior. Conversely, a Feedback B
or a Feedback U for an AS is referred to as the demonstration of poor behavior.
Essentially, a good behavior adheres to the behavioral assumptions, while poor
behaviors violates them. In general, there exists a 3×3 feedback matrix for every
provider ASa, at the observer, of the form:
Fa =
FG FB FUF ′G F ′B F ′U
F ′′G F
′′
B F
′′
U

where the element Fa(1, j), Fa(2, j), and Fa(3, j) stores the details of the BGP
service, which AS a provided when evaluated with respect to Bp, Bo, and Bl,
respectively. Finally, as the feedback are generated locally at the observer AS,
we do not have to consider the case of potentially dishonest feedback affecting
our reputation computation outcome.
4 BGP Service Evaluation and Feedback
In this section, we describe the metrics used in the behavior evaluation of service
elements. These metrics allow the feedback matrix to be populated, which will
subsequently be used to compute reputation. As mentioned earlier, the behavior
evaluation considers BGP services received during a 60 day observation window
and produces feedback on the providers. Figure 2 (b) illustrates the work-flow of
the evaluation process discussed in this section. The boxes with dashed outlines
illustrate the output produced at the end of analyzing a service based on each
of three behavior sets.
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Table 1. Feedback for Behavior Evaluation based on Bp
Prevalence Persistence Classification Feedback
high high Good FG
high low Vacillation FB
low high Good FG
low low Hijack FU
4.1 Evaluation of Service using Bp
Determining whether an AS-prefix binding (AS0, p) exhibits Bp builds on [13].
Therefore, in the rest of the section we briefly summarize the metrics used and
evaluation described therein. The evaluation is a three step process:
– Stability Analysis: For each (AS0, p) observed during the observation win-
dow, we compute two temporal metrics: persistence and prevalence 5. Preva-
lence (Ps), is the total percentage of time an AS-prefix binding is active
within the observation window. Persistence (Pr), on the other hand, is the
average duration of time an AS-prefix binding is active, within the observa-
tion window.
– Providing Feedback: The value of the Ps and Pr are compared against a set
of thresholds Tpr (1% of the observation window) and TPs (10 hours)
6 and
feedback provided. Table 1 shows the feedback matrix element updated for
different Pr and Ps values.
– Detecting Bogons: (AS0, p) is also statically checked for the presence of bo-
gons, and their discovery results in FU element being updated in the feedback
matrix Fa associated with AS0.
The case of Pr being high and Ps being low demonstrates a vacillating nature
of an AS-prefix binding. Detailed analysis of such bindings demonstrate that they
are usually legitimate [13]. However, the AS-prefix binding service element itself
vacillates between being active and inactive at a rate which is not conducive
for data communication. Further, it causes significant increase in the number
of updates exchanged to manage the changes causing frequent route flapping
[13]. Consequently, we give such vacillating behavior Feedback B because the
ASes execute BGP’s functionality correctly but fail to meet the requirement of
the behavior set. As for bogons, we believe their announcement subverts the
operation of BGP and we therefore give them Feedback U.
The results of the evaluation, based on Bp, are summarized in Figure 3. An
average of 421704.1 AS-prefix bindings were observed every observation window,
out of which an average of 4.0% were found to be hijacked7 involving 1.7% of all
the ASes. Similarly, about 6.9% of AS-prefix bindings were classified as vacillat-
ing, involving 3.1% of all the ASes. The number of ASes displaying exclusively
5 The principle idea of evaluating temporal characteristics comes from the observation
that legitimate AS-prefix pairs last long periods of time [21].
6 Both the thresholds have been established empirically, based on lowest false positive
and false negative rates when compared with Internet Route Registries (IRR) [13].
7 This number is unusually high due to the Internet-scale prefix hijacking attempt on
April 8th, 2010 by AS23724.
8
Property Value
Avg. # of ASPB** Observed 421704.1
Avg. # of  ASPB Provide Feedback U 6955.61***
Avg. # of ASPB Provide Feedback B 29256.6
Analysis of Bp*
Behavior Evaluation Results from Jan. 1, 2010 and Jun. 30, 2010 
(For each day, the analysis considers: I. BGP updates from the past 60 days for Bp and Bl, and II. AS relationship annotated topologies of the past 24 hours for Bo)
Property Value
Avg. # unique AS Observed 35448.2
Avg. # of AS with Feedback B 1132.8
Avg. # of AS with Feedback U 605.5
Avg. # of AS with Only Feedback B 17.8
Avg. # of AS with Only Feedback U 54.3
* No bogons were observed during the experiment periods
** ASPB: AS-prefix bindings
*** The actual value was higher, due to the Internet scale 
prefix hijacking mounted by AS23724 on Apr. 8, 2010.
Property Value
Avg. # of Paths 661395.7
Avg. # of Valley Routes 3447.8
Avg. #  of AS Creating Valley Routes 89.2
Avg. # of BGP Services Containing Illegal AS Number 44.1
Property Value
Avg. # of AS-links Observed 94754.2
Avg. # of Stable AS-links 91143.6
Avg. # of Unstable AS-links 3610.6
Property Value
Avg. # of Unique AS Observed 35667.2
Avg. # of AS Using Unstable AS-links 1945.7
Avg. # of AS Only Using Unstable AS-links 67.4
Analysis of Bo
Analysis of Bl
Fig. 3. AS Behavior Evaluation Statistics
poor behaviors is lower still. Finally, we observed zero occurrence of AS-prefix
bindings with bogon prefixes during any of the observation windows. We believe
this is because bogons are invariably filtered out by ASes that detect them. The
results demonstrate that a relatively large number of ASes (3-5%) are involved
in announcing vacillating and hijacked prefixes.
4.2 Evaluation of Service using Bo
To evaluate an AS-path vector based on Bo is a four step process: (1) Gener-
ating AS Relationship Map: We download that day’s annotated topology from
the UCLA’s Internet topology site [30] and merge it with a topology inferred
by applying Gao’s algorithm [15] to the previous day’s RouteViews data; (2)
Introduce Peers: We obtain the list of all tier-1 ASes from [2]. All links between
tier-1 ASes are re-labeled peer-to-peer (P2P), and links between tier-1 AS and
lower-tier AS are re-labeled Pv2C where the tier-1 AS is the provider (Pv); (3)
Providing Feedback: Once the merged annotated topology has been created, the
AS-path service element of all the services announced that day is evaluated for
the existence of ASes which might violate VFR. If such an AS is found, then
its F ′B entry in its feedback matrix is updated; and (4) Identifying Illegal ASes:
The AS PATH is finally examined for illegal AS numbers. This is done based
on a static check. The first legal AS, after the set of illegal ones is blamed and
its F ′B updated.
The use of two well-known AS topology relationship inference techniques in-
creases the confidence of our own relationship labeling. The violation of VFR is
given Feedback B because, though not good in the long run, it does not necessar-
ily affect the operation of BGP in providing knowledge about routes to prefixes.
In the case of illegal ASes, the first legal AS after a set of private ASes is blamed
because such leaking of private numbers usually happens when an AS forgets to
filter out local AS numbers before forwarding the update [23].
The results of the evaluation, based on Bo, are summarized in Figure 3.
We found that, an average of 661395.7 paths were observed per day. Out of
these, 0.5% paths were found to violate VFR per day. Finally, an average of
89.2 providers out of over 35K were seen violating VFR per day. On average,
we found only about 44.1 ASes involved in allowing illegal AS numbers in the
AS PATH, per day, during the six months of behavior analysis with respect to
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Bo. In summary, the violation to Bo, especially valley routes are prevalent and
a recurring event in the day to day operation of BGP.
Table 2. Feedback for Behavior Evaluation based on Bl
Prevalence Persistence Classification Feedback
high high Good F ′′G
high low Good F ′′G
low high Good F ′′G
low low Unstable F ′′U
4.3 Evaluation of Service using Bl
Computing the stability of an AS-link binding (ASi, ASj) in the AS PATH fol-
lows a similar approach to AS-prefix binding stability evaluation and uses the
prevalence and persistence metrics. The evaluation and feedback with respect
to Bl is done in three steps: (1) Identifying AS-link Bindings: This generates a
set L of all the AS-link bindings, decomposed from the services observed during
the observation window; (2) Computing Stability Metrics: This step computes
the prevalence (Pr) and persistence (Ps) for each of the AS-link in set L; (3)
Providing Feedback: The computed Pr and Ps values are then compared with a
threshold T lPr and T lPs and a feedback is provided. Table 2 shows the feedback
matrix element updated for different Pr and Ps values.
The reason we give unstable AS-links the Feedback U because it is possible
that poor AS-link stability is due to an attempted link spoofing which could
subvert the intended BGP operation. It should be noted that it is difficult to get
conclusive proof for the spoofing given a lack of ground truth, though we find
an interesting result which strengthens the case for their occurrence (see Section
5.2). We therefore argue that the potential of spoofing merits a punitive feedback
for ASes involved in unstable AS-links. The value of thresholds T lPr and T lPs
are set to 1% of the observation window and one hour, respectively. These values
are established empirically based on comparison with a set of AS-links D. The
set D is obtained from data-plane probing database provided by the CAIDA [3]
and DIMES [4] projects. The thresholds are the values below which, all the AS-
links in the set L, with the particular Pr and Ps, have the smallest intersection
with the set D. Data-plane probing is used because if a AS-link is ephemeral, it
has a low probability of being found in data-plane probing. Further, it is the only
form of ground-truth available that can reliably identify AS-links stable enough
to allow data traffic to pass through them [24].
Figure 3 shows the results of analysis, based on Bl. An average of 95640.4
AS-links were observed during the each of the observation windows. Out of these
over 96.1% AS-links received Feedback G. From the perspective of the ASes, on
average of 35667 ASes were seen every observation window, out of which 5.4%
ASes announced unstable AS-links at least once. Only about an average of 0.18%
of ASes announced purely unstable AS-links. Figure 4(a) visualizes 4625 unstable
AS-links seen each month over the course of the experiment involving 2305 ASes.
The dots are the ASes and the lines between them are unstable AS-links. The
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Fig. 4. (a) Visualization of Unstable AS-Links and the Provider ASes Involved, (b)
Extent of Poor Behaviors in the Internet
red dots represent the 149 ASes which have established unstable AS-links at
least once every month, during the course of our experiment. In summary, these
results demonstrate that unstable AS-links are a repetitive phenomena, affecting
a substantial number (5-6%) of ASes.
Figure 4(b) presents the extent of poor behavior seen every day between
Jan. 1, 2010 and Jun. 30, 2010. The trend graphs provide an overview of the
extent the poor behaviors of ASes aﬄicting inter-domain routing and how they
have evolved over time. The numbers are raw-values and include all AS-prefix
bindings, AS PATHS and AS-links, decomposed from the observed BGP ser-
vices. Overall, the problem of poor behavior is consistently present over the
course of the six months and is largely stable in its intensity, with occasional
spikes. These results do indicate the importance of monitoring AS-prefix binding
vacillation, AS-link stability and presence of valley route with the same diligence
as prefix hijacking.
5 Reputation Computation
At the end of behavior evaluation, we have a feedback matrix for each AS. This
will now be used to compute reputation. The reputation will allow the observer
AS to know the probability of a service element in a BGP service provided by an
AS, being given Feedback G (or Feedback B or Feedback U). Given the service
elements are orthogonal to each other, the reputation for an AS a is computed
as a 3× 3 matrix (just like Fa).
Ra =
RG RB RUR′G R′B R′U
R′′G R
′′
B R
′′
U

Here, the rows correspond to the reputation of the AS with respect to an AS-
prefix binding, AS-path, and AS-link binding service elements, respectively. We
do not arrive at a single number for reputation here, as it would not be able to
describe the behavior of an AS with the same level of detail.
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5.1 Reputation Computation
To calculate the reputation we use Bayesian statistics. Intuitively, if we have
random events with k possible outcomes, we can compute the posteriori prob-
abilities, i.e., the probabilities of observing these behaviors, using the Dirichlet
distribution if we assume the prior to be a Dirichlet distribution as well [8]. Then,
the reputation is the expected value of a posteriori probability distribution. The
reputation model presented here is a generalization of [20].
An important property of the Internet is that poor behaviors usually have
very short duration [13] [25]. Reputation value is designed to determine the ex-
pected probability of a service element in active service provided by an AS being
given Feedback G. Consequently, the reputation is calculated by weighing the
entries in the feedback set to a value proportional to the time the service re-
mained active within an observation window. In other words, after M trials, let
|FX | be the count of BGP services contained in FX , where X ∈ {G,B,U}, and
|FG| + |FB | + |FU | = M . Then, we define |FX | =
∑k
i=1 t(si), where k is the
total number of BGP services in FX and t(si) is the percentage of time a BGP
service si in FX is active within the observation window. As good behaviors last
a long duration compared to poor ones, at any given time within our observation
window, the probability of an active service having good service elements will
be much higher than probability of an active service with poor service elements.
Example: Let an AS0 provide four services S1, S2, S3, S4 where t(S1) = 0.95,
t(S2) = 0.70, t(S3) = 0.05 and t(S4) = 0.40, respectively. After evaluating
the services based on Bp, let S1 and S2 be give the Feedback G, S3 is given
Feedback B and S4 is given Feedback U. As each service element in a service is
independent of the others, t(S1) + t(S2) may be greater than 1. The reputation
of ASes is given by: |FG| = 0.95 + 0.70 = 1.65, |FB | = 0.05, |FU | = 0.4, resulting
in RG = (1.65 + 1)/(1.65 + 0.05 + 0.4 + 3) = 0.51, RB = (0.05 + 1)/(1.65 +
0.05 + 0.4 + 3) = 0.21, and RU = (0.4 + 1)/(1.65 + 0.05 + 0.4 + 3) = 0.28.
The value one added encodes the prior observation. We can compute reputation
values corresponding to other two behavior sets in a similar manner. It can be
seen that the reputation function redistributes the probability of poor behavior
in a manner proportional to the duration for which the service was active.
5.2 Reputation Analysis
In this section, we analyze the reputation of ASes, generated over a period of six
months from Jan. 1, 2010 - Jun. 30, 2010. We focus on presenting only the results
of the reputation due to poor behaviors. The reputation due to good behavior
is a complement of the results and can be easily extracted from these. Figure
5 (a) shows the CDF of reputations of ASes which have at least one Feedback
B or Feedback U for Bp, Bo and Bl. As reputation of ASes is computed every
day, we illustrate the CDFs for a sampling of six days during the six month
period. These graphs demonstrate three important points: (1) among the ASes
that do demonstrate poor behaviors, over 85% of them do so infrequently (in
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Fig. 5. (a) CDF of ASes with Poor Reputation Values, (b) Correlation between Various
Reputation Values
the case of Bo this number is over 99%); (2) about 2-8% of the ASes which
demonstrate poor behavior do so exclusively (i.e., the spike near the very end of
the distribution) for Bp and Bl; and (3) over 99% of the ASes have a reputation
close to zero for Bo, which means they are rarely involved in valley routes. This
result demonstrates the sensitivity of the reputation metric as it is able to capture
even those ASes which seldom violate BAs.
The availability of a quantitative value for different aspects of AS trustwor-
thiness in the form of reputation allows us to mine emergent AS behavior trends
that were heretofore difficult to identify. Figure 5 (b) illustrates the results of the
correlation between different elements of the reputation matrix. Interestingly, we
find RU (i.e., prefix hijacking) and R
′′
U (i.e., unstable AS-links) have a very high
correlation, over the six months of our experiments. This is very intriguing as it
increases the potential for low stability AS-links to be malicious (spoofed links).
None of the other reputation values are strongly correlated.
One of the ways of using the AS reputation information is to improve the
routing policies at ASes in order to minimize the effects of BA violations. In
this regard, we built a BGP simulator that uses AS reputation information
to make policy decisions about route-preference and route-dampening (i.e., a
process that prevents routers from thrashing while trying to incorporate a large
number of route updates, thus producing a more stable routing table). The idea
is to demonstrate that reputation information improves the number of quality
routes added to the routing tables of an AS compared to reputation-less scheme.
We find that, the reputation-based policy is particularly effective for reducing
hijacked entries in the routing table, with an average 13 fold reduction compared
to non-reputation case. Additionally, the reputation-based policy achieves two
and four fold reduction in adding valley routes and routes with unstable-links,
respectively. For more details on the simulation please refer to Section 6 in the
technical report [?].
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6 Related Work
Little work has been done with respect to characterizing AS behaviors. Most of
the work has focused on detecting prefix hijacking using control-plane [21] [25]
or data-plane probing [18] [32]. In [13], we present a preliminary version of this
system called AS-CRED. AS-CRED, computes reputations for ASes based on
their tendencies to hijack or announce short-lived prefixes as in this work. AS-
TRUST, on the other hand, considers many more aspects in reputation compu-
tation including valley free routing and AS-link stability. However, the principal
difference between the two is in the semantics of the reputation value. For exam-
ple, in AS-TRUST RU indicates how many prefix hijacking an AS performed.
This value is indifferent to the number of stable AS-prefix bindings the AS had.
For AS-CRED, reputation is simply a statement of how many prefix hijacking
an AS has mounted. AS-CRED reputations can therefore be compared with the
reputations of other ASes to see how they fare in comparison. With AS-TRUST,
each row in the reputation matrix is a normalized value and has a probabilistic
meaning. Therefore, poor behaviors of an AS cannot be seen independently of
its good behaviors. We believe, reputation values of AS-TRUST thus provide
a complimentary view of the AS behavior compared to the one provided by
AS-CRED.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we presented AS-TRUST, a reputation-based trust quantification
scheme with respect to the adherence of an AS to the three behavioral assump-
tions of BGP. Reputation is computed by evaluating past updates announced by
each observable AS in the Internet for the exhibition of specific behaviors. The
evaluation utilizes well-defined properties for this purpose including the presence
of stable AS-prefix binding, stable AS-links, and valley free routes. It then clas-
sifies the resulting observations into multiple types of feedback. The feedback
values are input into a reputation function that provides a probabilistic view of
trust. Analysis of AS-TRUST shows that the incidents of assumption violation
is consistently present, and that the proposed reputation mechanism can signif-
icantly improves the ability of ASes to function in the presence of violations of
behavioral assumptions. In the future, we plan to study the effectiveness of other
possible ways of using AS reputation to improve AS’ policies.
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